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| | Author | Message | v 
Posts: 4
Since: 7/17/2010
71.21.117.27
|  7/17/2010 8:14:15 AM 
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Chapter 6
Animal Psychology
or
That which was A, will be A.
That which was not-A, will be not-A.
Everything was and will be either A or not-A.
02-11-95
Q: (L) Earlier we were reading from Ouspensky's Tertium Organum about perceptions, was this a fairly accurate description of the state of our perceptions and the state of 2nd density perceptions?
A: Yes.
Q: (L) Okay, now making a jump with that, as to 4th density perception, is the 4th density perception...
A: Wait and see.
I know that a number of you are wondering about that remark about Ouspensky's description of the perceptions of 2nd density which was mentioned in a previous section of this series because you have written to ask me what, exactly, it was. Before I get into the Cassiopaean discussion here, I want to quote that passage we discussed at the session because the issue will come up again in this segment, and the reader might like to be familiar with what it says because everyone seems to want to know exactly why it is, and HOW it is, that we can be living in a world of such vastly different perceptions, and that these can have so profound an impact on us that it is possible that we live and move among beings that we cannot perceive. There is also the issue of what our own perceptions might be like after "graduation" to 4th density, and that is a question we would all like to have answered. So, perhaps, in his speculations on the matter, Ouspensky gave us some clues, though it is pretty certain that it was not all correct.
In fact, Ark and I have debated rather long over whether to share this extract or not because of what he perceives to be serious flaws in Ouspensky's "scientific arguments." Ark says they are not scientific at all and that Ouspensky makes leaps of assumption and statements without proof.
That may be true, but the point of the passage was to get something of an inkling of what might be the differences between human and animal experience of the world around us so that we might have a framework from which to speculate further.
In the meantime, Ark will be preparing some additional information about some of the current knowledge in particular areas bearing on the subject that Ouspensky might never have imagined, or if he did, he didn't imagine big enough, so stay tuned for that.
The extract is going to be a little long, but I just didn't see how I could shorten it without really losing something important. Even though the language is a little "dated," since it was written in the 20's or earlier, Ouspensky is pretty concise and economical with his words and there are very few that are "extra." But, the end result will be that, even for those who cannot just go out and buy the book, there will be a good understanding of what we are talking about from here on out when we talk about density "perceptions." And it is this idea of the differences that I want to convey, not necessarily the specifics as outlined by Ouspensky. So, please read it through even if you don't at first see the relevance, and you may be surprised at some of the ideas that will start popping up!
From Tertium Organum:
The basic unit of our perception is a sensation. A sensation is an elementary change in the state of our inner life, produced, or so it appears to us, either by some change in the state of the outer world in relation to our inner life, or by a change in our inner life in relation to the outer world. ...It is sufficient to define a sensation as an elementary change in the state of the inner life. Experiencing a sensation, we assume it to be, so to speak, a reflection of some kind of change in the external world.
The sensations experienced by us leave a certain trace in our memory. In accumulating, memories of sensations begin to blend in our consciousness into groups according to their similarity, to become associated, to be put together, or to be contrasted. Sensations, usually experienced in close connection with one another, will arise in our memory preserving the same connection. And gradually, out of memories of sensations there are formed representations.
Representations are, so to speak, group memories of sensations. In the formation of representations, the grouping of sensations follows two clearly defined directions. The first direction is according to the character of the sensations: thus sensation of yellow colour will be linked with other sensations of yellow colour, sensation of acid taste, with other sensations of acid taste. The second direction is according to the time of receiving the sensation.
When one group, forming one representation, contains different sensations experienced simultaneously, the memory of this definite group of sensations is attributed to a common cause. The "common cause" is projected into the external world, as the object; and it is assumed that the given representation reflects the real properties of this object.
Such a group memory constitutes a representation, as for instance, the representation of a tree - this tree. Into this group enters the green colour of the leaves, their smell, their shade, the sound of the wind in the branches, and so on. All these things, taken together, form as it were, the focus of rays emitted by our mind and gradually focused on the external object, which may coincide with it either badly or well.
In the further complexities of mental life, memories of representations undergo the same process as memories of sensations. In accumulating, memories of representations or "images of representation" become associated along the most varied lines, are put together, contrasted, form groups and, in the end, give rise to concepts.
Thus, out of the various sensations experienced at different times (in groups), there arises in a child the representation of a tree (this tree), and later, out of the images of representaions of different trees is formed the concept of a tree, i.e. not of this particular tree but of a tree in general.The formation of concepts leads to the formation of words and the appearance of speech.
Speech consists of words; every word expresses a concept. A concept and a word are really the same thing, only the one (the concept) stands, as it were, for the inner aspect, while the other (the word) stands for the outer aspect. The word is the algebraic sign of a thing.
In our speech words express concepts or ideas. Ideas are broader concepts; they are not a group sign for similar representations, but embrace groups of dissimilar representations, or even groups of concepts. Thus an idea is a complex or an abstract concept.
At the present moment an average man, taken as a standard, has three units of mental life - sensation, representation and concept.
Observation further shows us that in some people at certain moments there appears, as it were, a fourth unit of mental life, which different authors and schools call by different names, but in which the element of perception of the element of ideas is always connected with the emotional element. If Kant's idea is true, if space with its characteristics is a property of our consciousness and not a property of the external world, then the three-dimensionality of the world must in some way be dependent on the constitution of our mental apparatus.
Concretely, the question may be put in this way: What is the relation of the three-dimensional extension of the world to the fact that our mental apparatus contains sensations, representations and concepts, and that they stand exactly in this order?
We have a mental apparatus of this kind and the world is three-dimensional. How to prove that the three-dimensionality of the world depends on this particular constitution of our mental apparatus?
If we were able to alter our mental apparatus and observe that the world around us changed with these alterations, this would prove to us the dependence of the properties of space on the properties of our mind. If the above mentioned higher form of inner life, which now appears only accidentally depending on some little-known conditions, could be rendered as definite, as precise, as obedient to our will as a concept, and if, through this, the number of characteristics of space increased, i.e. if space, instead of being three-dimensional, became four dimensional, this would confirm our supposition and prove Kant's idea that space with its properties is the form of our sense perception.
If we could reduce the number of units of our mental life and deliberately deprive ourselves or some other man of concepts, leaving his or our mind to operate by representations and sensations alone; and if, through this, the number of characteristics of the space surrounding us diminished, i.e. if for that man the world were to become two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional and, with a further limitation of his mental apparatus, i.e. with depriving him of representaions, it were to become one-dimensional, this would confirm our surmise and Kant's thought could be regarded as proved.
Thus, Kant's idea could be proved experimentally if we were able to ascertain that for a being possesseing nothing but sensations the world is one-dimensional; for a being possessing sensations and representations it is two-dimensional; and for a being possessing, in addition to concepts and ideas, also higher forms of perception, the world is four-dimensional.
Kant's proposition regarding the subjective character of the idea of space could be taken as proved if:
a) for a being possessing nothing but sensations, our entire world with all its variety of forms appears as one line; if the universe of this being had one dimension, i.e. if this being were one-dimensional by virtue of the properties of his perception; and
b)for a being possessing the capacity of forming representations in addition to his ability of experiencing sensations, the world had a two-dimensional extension, i.e. if our entire world with its blue skies, clouds, green trees, mountains and precipices, appeared to him merely as a plane; if the universe of this being had only two dimensions, that is, if this being were two-dimensional by virtue of the properties of his perception.
More briefly, Kant's proposition would be proved if we saw that for a given subject the number of characteristics of the world changed according to the change of his mental apparatus.
| v
Posts: 4
Since: 7/17/2010
71.21.117.27
| 7/17/2010 8:19:48 AM
Chapter 6
Animal Psychology
or
That which was A, will be A.
That which was not-A, will be not-A.
Everything was and will be either A or not-A.
02-11-95
Q: (L) Earlier we were reading from Ouspensky's Tertium Organum about perceptions, was this a fairly accurate description of the state of our perceptions and the state of 2nd density perceptions?
A: Yes.
Q: (L) Okay, now making a jump with that, as to 4th density perception, is the 4th density perception...
A: Wait and see.
I know that a number of you are wondering about that remark about Ouspensky's description of the perceptions of 2nd density which was mentioned in a previous section of this series because you have written to ask me what, exactly, it was. Before I get into the Cassiopaean discussion here, I want to quote that passage we discussed at the session because the issue will come up again in this segment, and the reader might like to be familiar with what it says because everyone seems to want to know exactly why it is, and HOW it is, that we can be living in a world of such vastly different perceptions, and that these can have so profound an impact on us that it is possible that we live and move among beings that we cannot perceive. There is also the issue of what our own perceptions might be like after "graduation" to 4th density, and that is a question we would all like to have answered. So, perhaps, in his speculations on the matter, Ouspensky gave us some clues, though it is pretty certain that it was not all correct.
In fact, Ark and I have debated rather long over whether to share this extract or not because of what he perceives to be serious flaws in Ouspensky's "scientific arguments." Ark says they are not scientific at all and that Ouspensky makes leaps of assumption and statements without proof.
That may be true, but the point of the passage was to get something of an inkling of what might be the differences between human and animal experience of the world around us so that we might have a framework from which to speculate further.
In the meantime, Ark will be preparing some additional information about some of the current knowledge in particular areas bearing on the subject that Ouspensky might never have imagined, or if he did, he didn't imagine big enough, so stay tuned for that.
The extract is going to be a little long, but I just didn't see how I could shorten it without really losing something important. Even though the language is a little "dated," since it was written in the 20's or earlier, Ouspensky is pretty concise and economical with his words and there are very few that are "extra." But, the end result will be that, even for those who cannot just go out and buy the book, there will be a good understanding of what we are talking about from here on out when we talk about density "perceptions." And it is this idea of the differences that I want to convey, not necessarily the specifics as outlined by Ouspensky. So, please read it through even if you don't at first see the relevance, and you may be surprised at some of the ideas that will start popping up!
From Tertium Organum:
The basic unit of our perception is a sensation. A sensation is an elementary change in the state of our inner life, produced, or so it appears to us, either by some change in the state of the outer world in relation to our inner life, or by a change in our inner life in relation to the outer world. ...It is sufficient to define a sensation as an elementary change in the state of the inner life. Experiencing a sensation, we assume it to be, so to speak, a reflection of some kind of change in the external world.
The sensations experienced by us leave a certain trace in our memory. In accumulating, memories of sensations begin to blend in our consciousness into groups according to their similarity, to become associated, to be put together, or to be contrasted. Sensations, usually experienced in close connection with one another, will arise in our memory preserving the same connection. And gradually, out of memories of sensations there are formed representations.
Representations are, so to speak, group memories of sensations. In the formation of representations, the grouping of sensations follows two clearly defined directions. The first direction is according to the character of the sensations: thus sensation of yellow colour will be linked with other sensations of yellow colour, sensation of acid taste, with other sensations of acid taste. The second direction is according to the time of receiving the sensation.
When one group, forming one representation, contains different sensations experienced simultaneously, the memory of this definite group of sensations is attributed to a common cause. The "common cause" is projected into the external world, as the object; and it is assumed that the given representation reflects the real properties of this object.
Such a group memory constitutes a representation, as for instance, the representation of a tree - this tree. Into this group enters the green colour of the leaves, their smell, their shade, the sound of the wind in the branches, and so on. All these things, taken together, form as it were, the focus of rays emitted by our mind and gradually focused on the external object, which may coincide with it either badly or well.
In the further complexities of mental life, memories of representations undergo the same process as memories of sensations. In accumulating, memories of representations or "images of representation" become associated along the most varied lines, are put together, contrasted, form groups and, in the end, give rise to concepts.
Thus, out of the various sensations experienced at different times (in groups), there arises in a child the representation of a tree (this tree), and later, out of the images of representaions of different trees is formed the concept of a tree, i.e. not of this particular tree but of a tree in general.The formation of concepts leads to the formation of words and the appearance of speech.
Speech consists of words; every word expresses a concept. A concept and a word are really the same thing, only the one (the concept) stands, as it were, for the inner aspect, while the other (the word) stands for the outer aspect. The word is the algebraic sign of a thing.
In our speech words express concepts or ideas. Ideas are broader concepts; they are not a group sign for similar representations, but embrace groups of dissimilar representations, or even groups of concepts. Thus an idea is a complex or an abstract concept.
At the present moment an average man, taken as a standard, has three units of mental life - sensation, representation and concept.
Observation further shows us that in some people at certain moments there appears, as it were, a fourth unit of mental life, which different authors and schools call by different names, but in which the element of perception of the element of ideas is always connected with the emotional element. If Kant's idea is true, if space with its characteristics is a property of our consciousness and not a property of the external world, then the three-dimensionality of the world must in some way be dependent on the constitution of our mental apparatus.
Concretely, the question may be put in this way: What is the relation of the three-dimensional extension of the world to the fact that our mental apparatus contains sensations, representations and concepts, and that they stand exactly in this order?
We have a mental apparatus of this kind and the world is three-dimensional. How to prove that the three-dimensionality of the world depends on this particular constitution of our mental apparatus?
If we were able to alter our mental apparatus and observe that the world around us changed with these alterations, this would prove to us the dependence of the properties of space on the properties of our mind. If the above mentioned higher form of inner life, which now appears only accidentally depending on some little-known conditions, could be rendered as definite, as precise, as obedient to our will as a concept, and if, through this, the number of characteristics of space increased, i.e. if space, instead of being three-dimensional, became four dimensional, this would confirm our supposition and prove Kant's idea that space with its properties is the form of our sense perception.
If we could reduce the number of units of our mental life and deliberately deprive ourselves or some other man of concepts, leaving his or our mind to operate by representations and sensations alone; and if, through this, the number of characteristics of the space surrounding us diminished, i.e. if for that man the world were to become two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional and, with a further limitation of his mental apparatus, i.e. with depriving him of representaions, it were to become one-dimensional, this would confirm our surmise and Kant's thought could be regarded as proved.
Thus, Kant's idea could be proved experimentally if we were able to ascertain that for a being possesseing nothing but sensations the world is one-dimensional; for a being possessing sensations and representations it is two-dimensional; and for a being possessing, in addition to concepts and ideas, also higher forms of perception, the world is four-dimensional.
Kant's proposition regarding the subjective character of the idea of space could be taken as proved if:
a) for a being possessing nothing but sensations, our entire world with all its variety of forms appears as one line; if the universe of this being had one dimension, i.e. if this being were one-dimensional by virtue of the properties of his perception; and
b)for a being possessing the capacity of forming representations in addition to his ability of experiencing sensations, the world had a two-dimensional extension, i.e. if our entire world with its blue skies, clouds, green trees, mountains and precipices, appeared to him merely as a plane; if the universe of this being had only two dimensions, that is, if this being were two-dimensional by virtue of the properties of his perception.
More briefly, Kant's proposition would be proved if we saw that for a given subject the number of characteristics of the world changed according to the change of his mental apparatus.
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Transmitted: 5/7/2024 2:12:34 AM
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